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ABSTRACT
It is sometimes thought that non-liberal regimes are inimical to 
religious freedom, even if secular. This Article argues against this 
view. It holds that a non-liberal order that does not fully commit to 
state neutrality, but permits the regulation of and interference with 
religion, can nonetheless be protective of religious freedom if the 
secularism that it practices has the following four characteristics: 
(1) a rejection of political dominance by any one religious group; (2) 
citizenship should not be conditioned on a person’s religious 
identity; (3) the recognition of an individual right to religious 
freedom, even if such a right is not regarded as fundamental; and (4) 
a commitment to protect religious freedom as part of the public 
good. One such important public good is the peaceful coexistence of 
religious groups. This Article, then, examines how a commitment to 
peaceful coexistence could provide some protection to religious 
freedom and employs Singapore as a key case study to draw out the 
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Imagine this scenario: A religiously pluralistic society 
consisting of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and others. 
The Muslims, by way of convention, use the loudspeaker for their 
muezzin calls at their mosques. Non-Muslim residents around the 
area tolerate it as part of society’s existing culture. A group of 
Christians decide that they too would like to broadcast their religious 
services, especially their hymns. There are perhaps more Christians 
than Muslims in that particular society; thus, broadcasting Christian 
hymns would benefit more people than the Muslims’ muezzin calls.1
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How should a state manage such a request from the Christians to 
broadcast their religious services? Can it, and should it? Would 
granting the request to one group lead to requests from other groups, 
and consequently a competition among the different religious 
groups? If so, would that undermine social peace? 
A liberal state’s response is constrained by two foundational 
doctrines. First, the strictly liberal state cannot make choices that 
would amount to preferring one vision of the public good over 
another. Secondly, the liberal state protects the right to religious 
freedom as a matter of its commitment to the prioritization of 
individual autonomy.2 In this regard, the liberal state is likely to 
respond to the conundrum posed above by enacting or referring to 
facially neutral laws, such as noise pollution restrictions, that would 
apply equally to all religious groups.3 Such a law could also be 
justified on the basis of non-coercion of individual choices. This 
could have the effect of preventing all religious groups, including the 
Muslims, from being able to broadcast their religious prayers. 
Whereas Muslims may have had the liberty to do so in the past, the 
enactment of facially neutral laws would restrict that liberty unless 
at the National University of Singapore’s Faculty of Law (Research Grant No.: C-
241-000-504-091). All errors remain mine. 
1. I sketched this from a real-life example that the Singapore government 
encountered in the 1960s when it became a newly independent state, although the 
request there was made by the Buddhists and not by the Christians. 
2. Of course, liberalism is an internally diverse tradition and as Rawls 
notes, “there are many liberalisms,” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 223 
(1993), such that some have claimed that liberalism is an essentially contested 
concept. See Ruth Abbey, Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?, 27 
NEW POL. SCI. 461, 462 (2005); Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the
Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 765 (1993). Essentially contested 
concepts are defined as “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves 
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.” W. B. Gallie, 
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169 (1956).
Here, I have merely identified two central tenets of liberalism that have been 
relevant for secularism. 
3. See Udi Shaham, Cabinet Advances ‘Muezzin Bill’, JERUSALEM POST
(Feb. 12, 2017, 9:32 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Cabinet-advances-
muezzin-bill-481351 [https://perma.cc/BJ69-E7VM]. Such a law could be crafted in 
facially neutral terms, but have a clearly discriminatory impact. For example, see the 
discussion and revisions to the proposal in Israel to ban religious institutions from 
using outdoor loudspeakers at night on the basis that this is to prevent disrupting the 
sleep of the population. Id. Whether Israel could be considered a liberal state is a 
matter up for debate, but the purpose of referring to the discussion on this bill is to 
highlight the sometimes discriminatory impact of laws that are portrayed in ‘secular’ 
neutral terms. Id.
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they can obtain an exemption on account of religious freedom. 
However, that is unlikely since the ability to broadcast is a group 
right rather than an individual right. Since the liberal state recognizes 
and protects religious freedom as part of individual autonomy, it 
tends to undervalue group rights. 
But what happens to religious freedom in a secular but non-
liberal state? This Article posits that a secular but non-liberal state 
could, in some circumstances, be in a better position to manage the 
expectations of different religious groups and produce settlements 
that are more acceptable to these groups. Furthermore, such a polity 
is able to provide a robust measure of protection for religious 
freedom, despite its non-liberal commitment. To be clear, by “non-
liberal but secular,” I mean a state that does not claim to be 
religiously neutral and does not recognize and protect religious 
freedom as part of its prioritization of individual autonomy. I 
propose that two implications follow from this decoupling of 
secularism from liberalism. The first is that religious freedom is not 
recognized and protected as a matter of individual autonomy, which 
could mean greater recognition of the group aspects of religious 
profession and practice. Secondly, a non-liberal government has 
greater liberty to directly intervene in matters concerning religion 
and in regulating relationships among the different religious groups.
Moreover, by a secular state, I mean a state where political 
authority does not depend on religious legitimation or authority, and 
religious authority does not dominate political authority.4 This is a 
minimalist understanding of secularism and is compatible with many 
types of political systems, including communitarian, authoritarian, 
and socialist systems, all of which could fall within the category of 
“non-liberal.” I propose, however, that this basic conception of a 
secular state does not necessarily result in a positive protection of 
religious freedom. One could conceive of such a state where political 
authority is separated from religious authority as nonetheless not 
protecting religious freedom as a matter of neglect or, worse, as a 
result of perceiving religion as hostile to state ideology. Indeed, 
Professor Durham has argued that a negative identification between 
the state and religion correlate with low levels of individual religious 
4. Several scholars adopt this minimalist understanding of the requirement 
of secularism. See, e.g., Tariq Modood, State-Religion Connections and 
Multicultural Citizenship, in RELIGION, SECULARISM & CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 182, 183 (Jean L. Cohen & Cécile Laborde eds., 2016); Alfred C. 
Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations”, 11 J. DEMOCRACY 37,
39-40 (2000).
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freedom.5 Identification here “refers to the degree and type of 
interrelation between the state, as the governmental expression of 
society, and the church, as the institutional manifestations of 
society’s religious expression.”6
This however does not mean that a secular but non-liberal state 
could not robustly protect religious freedom. It merely means that 
outside of liberal constraints, the content of secularism becomes even 
more crucial in imbuing constitutional law with the necessary 
conditions for protecting religious freedom. Here, I argue that, at a 
minimum, secularism in a non-liberal state needs commitment to 
four characteristics in order to protect religious freedom. First, the 
secular state must entail a rejection of permanent political dominance 
by any religion. Secondly, in such a secular state, citizenship should 
not be conditioned on a person’s religious identity. Thirdly, such a 
secular state must recognize the availability of an individual right to 
religious freedom, even if such a right may not be prioritized as a 
fundamental right. Lastly, religious freedom must be protected as a 
function of the public good. One such example of the public good 
that this Article will discuss is social peace, or more specifically, the 
peaceful coexistence of diverse religious groups. 
As I will explain below, these characteristics are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for a secular state to be conducive for the 
protection of the right to religious freedom. Furthermore, there are 
limits to this; since protection of religious freedom is an instrumental 
and not an intrinsic value, restrictions are viewed as legitimate when 
the exercise of certain religious beliefs and/or practices may 
undermine peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, this contribution to the 
special issue serves to interrogate the relationship between liberalism 
and secularism. This Article argues that the question, whether 
secularism is a non-negotiable part of liberalism, is an important and 
legitimate one, it is sometimes the wrong question to ask in 
jurisdictions that lack a commitment to liberalism. Instead, this 
contribution argues that secularism can perform a crucial function in 
constraining state power even under non-liberal conditions. 
5. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative 
Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1, 15, 18 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
According to Durham, other than negative identification, positive identification also 
correlates with low levels of religious freedom. Id.
6. George R. Ryskamp, Comment, The Spanish Experience in Church–
State Relations: A Comparative Study of the Interrelationship Between Church–
State Identification and Religious Liberty, 1980 BYU L. REV. 616, 617 (1980).
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Consequently, insofar as the theme of this special issue is aimed at 
determining the value and importance of secularism, this Article 
proposes that secularism remains an important concept in 
constitutionalism. 
This Article thus examines the potential and the limits of 
secularism outside the constraints of liberalism to protect religious 
freedom. In Part I, I discuss briefly the concepts of secularism, 
liberalism, and religious freedom, and the relationship among them. 
Part II sketches out my minimalist conception of secularism that 
could provide the necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, 
conditions for the protection of religious freedom in non-liberal 
regimes. In Part III, I examine the experience of Singapore to show 
how the presence of this minimalist secularism has led to fairly high 
levels of religious freedom. This case study shows the limitations of 
this non-liberal secular approach in ensuring robust protection of 
religious freedom. 
I. SECULARISM IN A NON-LIBERAL STATE
There are many varieties of non-liberal constitutions, ranging 
from anti-liberal constitutions to constitutions that are ambivalent 
about liberalism to constitutions that are semi-liberal. Historically, 
this variety could also refer to pre-liberal constitutions.7 As Graham 
Walker points out, the alternatives to liberalism are “varied and 
competing,” since they are united as a category only by their 
negation of the principal liberal affirmations prioritizing individual 
rights and endorsing state neutrality.8 Consequently, non-liberal 
states privilege a substantive vision of the public good, and this 
could be based on ethnicity, religion, or communal morality.9
Furthermore, there are many understandings of secularism.10
The word “secular” has its etymology in Latin where saeculum refers 
7. In her discussion about illiberal polities, Professor Thio uses the term 
illiberal in a more generic fashion, positing that illiberal polities could encompass 
illiberal, pre-liberal, non-liberal, or semi-liberal societies. Thio Li-ann, 
Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133, 134 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
8. Graham Walker, The New Mixed Constitution: A Response to Liberal 
Debility & Constitutional Deadlock in Eastern Europe, 26 POLITY 503, 506 (1994). 
9. Graham Walker, The Mixed Constitution After Liberalism, 4 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 311, 315, 319 (1996). 
10. See, e.g., Rajeev Bhargava, Multiple Secularisms and Multiple Secular 
States, in CONTESTING SECULARISM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17, 17 (Anders 
Berg-Sørensen ed., 2013); Veit Bader, Constitutionalizing Secularism, Alternative 
Religious Freedom & Secularism in a Non-Liberal State 339
to “age,” “century,” or “profane time, [i.e.] the time of ordinary 
historical succession,” which is in contradistinction to higher times 
or eternity, defined as “the time of the Ideas, or of the Origin, or of 
God.”11 “The notion was used in contrast not to religion but to 
eternity.”12 While much has been done to distinguish secularism from 
closely related concepts like the secular,13 secularity,14 and 
secularization,15 I do not attempt to do so here, although, I 
acknowledge the importance of this discussion. Instead, for the 
purposes of this Article, I find useful Professor Adhar’s 
conceptualization of secularism as denoting a political philosophy 
that “denies the existence or relevance of a transcendental or divine 
dimension to public affairs,”16 while acknowledging that there can be 
other conceptualizations which merely deny religion’s 
Secularisms or Liberal-Democratic Constitutionalism?: A Critical Reading of Some 
Turkish, ECtHR and Indian Supreme Court Cases on ‘Secularism’, 6 UTRECHT L.
REV. 8, 9 (2010) (calling secularism a “very complex,” “polysemic,” “essentially 
contested concept,” even “fuzzy,” “chameleonic,” “highly misleading,” or 
“cacophonous”).
11. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS
31, 31-32 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998). 
12. Rex J. Ahdar, Is Secularism Neutral?, 26 RATIO JURIS 404, 405 (2013). 
Furthermore, note Professor Asad’s powerful critique that the secular cannot be 
understood apart from religion, nor can it be seen as a successor to religion. TALAL 
ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 2 (2003).
13. See, e.g., José Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 76 SOC. RES.
1049, 1049 (2009) (explaining that the author sees “secular” as a central modern 
epistemic category and “secularism” as a worldview).
14. See CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 2-3 (2007). Professor Taylor 
refers to “secularity” as the condition of being secular. Id. He further identifies three 
senses of secularity: first, the separation of religion from common political 
institutions and practices; secondly, the decline of religious belief and practice in 
society; and lastly, the change in the conditions of belief from one where belief in 
God is unchallenged to one where it is understood to be one option among others. 
Id. at 1-3. This last sense of secularity is Taylor’s key insight to this area of 
scholarship. Id. at 3. Furthermore, Professor Brett G. Scharffs uses the terms 
“secularity” and “secularism” as respectively referring to an approach to state-
religion relations and “an ideological position that is committed to promoting a 
secular order.” Brett G. Scharffs, Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential 
Distinction Between Secularity and Secularism, 6 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 109, 110-
11 (2011).
15. See JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 7
(1994). Professor Casanova uses “secularization” to refer to an analytical 
conceptualization of modern world historical processes, which he defines as 
entailing at least three propositions: the decline of belief, the differentiation of 
public and private spheres (with religion being assigned to the latter), and the 
marginalization of religion. Id.
16. Ahdar, supra note 12, at 408.
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predominance.17 This basic understanding of secularism allows for a 
range of political and institutional arrangements. This contrasts with 
an alternative understanding of secularism as requiring state 
neutrality18 with regard to religion, which I argue stems from a 
liberal underpinning that is not often carefully delineated from 
secularism.19
Consequently, one should be able to conceptualize secularism 
apart from liberalism and identify a form of secularism that could 
operate within non-liberal conditions. There is nothing inherent 
within secularism that entails liberal ideas or religious freedom, 
especially religious freedom understood as individual autonomy. 
Indeed, secularism’s significance could be magnified in the non-
liberal context since it becomes a basis for rejecting religious 
hegemony in the political system and for recognizing religious 
freedom. Thus, a non-liberal state could privilege a substantive 
vision of the good based on religion, but a commitment to secularism 
would serve to guard against the state becoming fully theocratic, 
which would usually entail a rejection of an individual right to 
profess and practice one’s religion.20
The importance of secularism is manifold. For instance, 
Professor Bhargava argues that the point of political secularism in a 
constitutional democracy is to ensure that the social and political 
17. I am grateful to Arif Jamal specifically for this point. 
18. This emphasis on neutrality is associated with the liberal ideal of the 
neutral state as prioritizing the right over the good. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism,
in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 113 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978); Peter 
Jones, The Ideal of the Neutral State, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 9, 9 (Robert E. 
Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989); Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or 
Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 74, 75 (James 
Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990). Neutrality has been seriously contested 
and can refer to a great range of different ideas, although many scholars still defend 
it. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Neutralities, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 29, 29 (R. 
Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara & Henry S. Richardson eds., 1990); Gerald F. 
Gaus, Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle, in PERFECTIONISM 
AND NEUTRALITY 137, 160-61 (Steven Wall & George Klosko eds., 2003). 
19. The failure to identify liberal assumptions is not unique to discussions 
on secularism. As Professor Walker argues, this failure often carries over to 
discussions about constitutionalism, such as where it is said that the protection of 
fundamental rights is a distinct feature of constitutionalism. Graham Walker, The 
Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 154, 169 
(Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997). 
20. One could even see this as the result of mixed constitutionalism at 
work, whereby liberalism and non-liberal principles moderate the absolutism of 
either side. Walker, supra note 9.
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order is free of institutionalized religious domination, hegemony,
tyranny, oppression, religious-based exclusions, and violations of 
equal citizenship.21 One could further distill one very important idea 
often associated with the aim of secularism, which is the protection 
of religious freedom. Religious freedom has also come to encompass 
a wide range of ideas and practices, though the freedom to choose, to 
worship, and to practice one’s religion is part of its normative core.22
While religious freedom in liberal states is justified on the basis of a 
commitment to personal autonomy,23 religious freedom in a non-
liberal state needs a different account than in a liberal state.24 In the 
liberal state, the right to freedom of religion is valued for “its 
importance to the human condition” and not because of any “utility 
to social organization.”25 The dominant settlement in the liberal state, 
therefore, is one built upon a public–private divide where religion 
becomes privatized as a guarantee for religious liberty.26 This 
21. Rajeev Bhargava, Is European Secularism Secular Enough?, in
RELIGION, SECULARISM & CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 157, 158-
59 (emphasis added).
22. Lindholm identifies eight components to the normative core of religious 
freedom, as elicited from existing international human rights instruments. Tore 
Lindholm, Freedom of Religion or Belief from a Human Rights Perspective, in 
FREEDOM OF BELIEF AND CHRISTIAN MISSION 3, 9-10 (Hans Aage Gravaas et al. eds., 
2015); see also FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF xxxvii-ix (Tore 
Lindholm et al. eds., 2004). 
23. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE
76 (2d ed. 2013).
24. Furthermore, Professor Brownstein describes the free exercise of 
religion as a “right of self-determination and fulfillment,” and as a “dignitary right,” 
which is “part of that basic autonomy of identity and self-creation which we 
preserve from state manipulation.” Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly 
and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and 
Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 95 (1990) (emphasis added). One 
important critique of this understanding of religious freedom is that it takes away the 
special character of religion under the law since it is simply one of the choices that 
one can make in exercising one’s individual autonomy. Michael J. Sandel, Religious 
Liberty—Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 597, 
608 (1989).
25. See Brownstein, supra note 24, at 95.
26. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 170-71 (1999). But 
Professor Fish criticizes the liberal principle of religious freedom for prioritizing 
individualistic choices, privatization of religion, and appealing only to “squeamish” 
religions. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between 
Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2272, 2280 (1997). Fish borrows the 
term “squeamish” religions from Jeremy Waldron, Locke: Toleration and the 
Rationality of Persecution, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 61, 63 (Susan Mendus ed., 
1988).
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arrangement is consistent with the liberal state’s claim for neutrality. 
In a non-liberal state, the political settlement is not premised on this 
public-private divide or on a strong claim of neutrality. It would, 
however, be a mistake to think that a non-liberal state cannot provide 
high levels of protection for religious freedom. In the non-liberal 
state, religious freedom needs to be justified on different grounds, 
but the form of secularism it practices could provide the necessary 
conditions for a high level of protection. In this regard, I posit four 
characteristics that secularism in a non-liberal state must have to 
protect religious freedom. 
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN A SECULAR BUT NON-LIBERAL STATE:
FOUR NECESSARY CHARACTERISTICS
A. First Characteristic: Rejection of Political Dominance by Any 
Religion 
The first characteristic is that the secular principle(s) adopted 
must entail the rejection of permanent political dominance by any 
religion. While this may appear to be self-evident from the fact of 
secularism itself, that is not the case. Some have suggested that 
secularism is compatible with the dominance of one religion over 
others, even in claimed liberal regimes.27 For instance, it is argued 
that countries with a state church, like England, Sweden, and 
previously Norway, are nonetheless secular because these are 
“vestigial and largely symbolic”28 arrangements. Indeed, it has been 
argued that such “mild” state entanglement in religious matters does 
not breach the liberal requirements of neutrality provided it is non-
coercive.29 I will here attempt to identify what secularism requires in 
relation to political power and it is this: the rejection of permanent 
and effective (as opposed to formal) political dominance, which I 
define as a monopoly on political power.30 To be clear, this does not 
mean that other forms of dominance are not important. Dominance 
27. Charles Taylor, The Meaning of Secularism, 12 HEDGEHOG REV. 23, 25 
(2010). Taylor talks about a secular regime involving some kind of separation of 
church and state where “[t]he state can’t be officially linked to some religious 
confession, except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense.” Id. at 23.
28. Id. at 23.
29. AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 23, at 61. 
30. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 335-36 (1974).
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can be defined in political,31 social,32 demographic, cultural,33
symbolic,34 and economic35 terms. Moreover, other forms of 
dominance can be crucial factors in maintaining political 
dominance.36
Consequently, if a constitutional system restricts or gives 
priority regarding political representation or participation only to 
persons from particular religious background(s), that constitutes 
permanent and effective (as well as formal) political dominance, as it 
gives one religious group a monopoly on political power. In other 
words, if the constitution stipulates that only persons who are from 
religion Z can be the prime minister or president, and/or if only 
persons from religion Z can vote, then this would not comply with 
even the first characteristic of this minimal secularism. Admittedly, 
most constitutional systems are not so stark in restricting political 
representation and participation to a particular religious group. 
Furthermore, even if certain positions are reserved for certain 
religious groups, this does not ipso facto result in permanent political 
dominance if other important political positions are open to persons 
31. See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT (1997) (discussing political liberty as non-domination). 
32. See, e.g., FRANK LOVETT, A GENERAL THEORY OF DOMINATION AND 
JUSTICE (2010) (discussing domination as a condition experienced due to 
dependence on a social relationship). 
33. For example, Tomlinson uses “cultural imperialism” to refer to the 
“exercise of domination in cultural relationships in which the values, practices, and 
meanings of a powerful foreign culture are imposed upon one or more native 
cultures.” John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBALIZATION (2012). 
34. See, for example, Anthony Smith’s work on “dominant ethnic” as 
providing legitimating myths, symbols, and conceptions of territory. ANTHONY D.
SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS 138-41 (1986); see also Eric P. Kaufmann,
Dominant Ethnie, in THE COMPANION GUIDE TO NATIONALISM 12-13 (2000). 
35. For instance, Subramanian has created an index of economic dominance 
based on a combination of each country’s share of world GDP, trade, and foreign 
investment. ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, ECLIPSE: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA’S
ECONOMIC DOMINANCE (2011). 
36. For instance, minorities can gain dominance through economic power. 
See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003); see also R. A.
SCHERMERHORN, COMPARATIVE ETHNIC RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THEORY 
AND RESEARCH (1970), discussing the concept of an “elite minority” and Ashley 
Doane using politico-economic hegemony as the measure of dominant ethnicity. 
Ashley W. Doane, Jr., Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States: The 
Role of “Hidden” Ethnicity in Intergroup Relations, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 375 
(1997). 
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from other backgrounds. Thus, a consociational democracy,37 like in 
Lebanon, where different positions are reserved for persons from 
different religious backgrounds38 would not result in permanent 
political dominance, since different religious groups are represented 
in different positions of power in government. As such, such a 
consociational system would still comply with this requirement of 
secularism. 
The key motivation behind the first requirement is that the 
constitutional system should not permanently exclude religious 
groups that are most likely to be in the minority from the possibility 
of obtaining political power. This, however, is a minimal 
requirement as the demographics and economic power that some 
groups have could lead to them having a continuous hold over 
political power. Nonetheless, so long as the political philosophy 
conceptualizes political power as not being permanently tied to one 
particular religious group, this would likely comply with the 
proposed non-dominance requirement of minimal secularism. 
B. Second Characteristic: Citizenship Not Conditioned by Religious 
Identity
The second requirement of minimalist secularism is that 
citizenship should not be conditioned on religious identity. There 
should be no discrimination on religious grounds for anyone to 
become citizen of a state. There may be other grounds for excluding 
a person from becoming a citizen, such as residency, birth, or 
37. Consociationalism is a form of democracy that institutionalizes power-
sharing in a state comprising diverse groups. According to Lijphart’s classic theory, 
it is defined by four characteristics: 
[(1) G]overnment by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all 
significant segments of the plural society . . . [(2)] mutual veto or 
“concurrent majority” rule, . . . [(3)] proportionality as the principal 
standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and 
allocation of public funds, and [(4)] a high degree of autonomy for each 
segment to run its own internal affairs. 
AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 
25 (1977). 
38. In Lebanon, “The consociational system allocated the presidency to a 
Christian Maronite, the premiership to a Muslim Sunni, and the Speakership to a 
Muslim Shi’ite.” Imad Salamey, Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and 
Integrative Options, 14 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 83, 83-85 (2009). In addition, public 
offices and elected seats of the National Assembly are apportioned according to 
religious/sectarian affiliations. See discussion on Lebanon’s consociational system 
and critique that it is conducive to conflict and national fragmentation. Id.
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descent, but these grounds should have no relation with a person’s 
religious identity.39 Citizenship is an important status in that it gives 
persons membership in a political community and with it certain 
rights and privileges.40 Familiar elements associated with citizenship 
include “equal legal status, rights and obligations, political voice and 
participation, the freedom to enter and exit one’s home country, and 
the less tangible notions of identity, belonging, and a sense of 
home.”41 This requirement does not rise to the liberal ideal that the 
state should treat its citizens with equal concern and respect.42 In a 
liberal context, equal respect would mean that citizens are to be 
treated according to how they wish to be treated and not according to 
a particular conception of the good life.43 Admittedly, this basic form 
of equality in citizenship does not fully address potential conflicts 
between religious freedom and equality, such as where religious 
groups defend discriminatory practices against women, 
homosexuals, or unorthodox groups. Furthermore, religious identity 
may still play a part in allocating citizenship where religious groups, 
particularly oppressed minorities, are not recognized as citizens in 
the first place and therefore are not able to pass down citizenship to 
their children by descent. In this regard, jus sanguinis could operate 
in more discriminatory fashion than jus soli. Religious identity could 
also play a part in allocating citizenship through naturalization, 
which is the only legal method for acquiring citizenship other than 
through birthright (i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis).44
The rise of citizenship tests in recent times, which congregate 
around substantive requirements showing commitment to “shared 
values,”45 including knowledge of the new country’s language, 
political system, and forms of government, have not been limited to 
non-liberal entities. Some citizenship tests examine an applicant’s 
personal beliefs and moral judgments, and these may include their 
views on “gender equality, religion, conversion, politics, marital 
39. Of course, there are other issues with regard to allocating citizenship on 
the basis of birth or descent, which could be considered arbitrary criteria: “One is 
based on the accident of birth within particular geographical borders while the other 
is based on the sheer luck of descent.” See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT
LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 7 (2009). 
40. Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 1002-03.
41. Id. at 1004-05.
42. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977). 
43. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985). 
44. See Shachar, supra note 40, at 1012.
45. Id. at 1013.
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relations, promiscuity, and culture.”46 Thus, while there is no 
religious test strictly speaking since citizenship tests do not 
automatically qualify persons from some religious backgrounds and 
disqualify others from other religious backgrounds, requirements that 
the applicants’ personal beliefs be compatible with the new country’s 
national culture may amount to indirect discrimination against some 
religious groups. For instance, one could see the religious factor in 
play in the well-publicized case of burqa-wearing Faiza Silmi who 
was denied French citizenship despite being married to a French 
citizen, mothering three French children, and speaking French. The 
le Conseil d’Etat (France’s highest administrative court) rejected her 
appeal, ruling that Silmi observes a “radical religious practice” that 
was not compatible with the “values essential to the French 
communauté, notably the principle of gender equality.”47 This case 
took place in France and suggests that the liberal prioritization of 
individual autonomy may sometimes result in denying persons the 
right to religious freedom. 
A non-liberal entity, on the other hand, may not see a rejection 
of citizenship on the basis of insufficient assimilation arising from 
one’s religious convictions as necessarily problematic. However, the 
secularism that it subscribes to should entail a minimal commitment 
not to limit access to citizenship on explicit grounds of religion.48
This is important because this will ensure that the non-liberal entity 
will remain or will become religiously pluralistic. If citizenship is 
available only to persons from specific religion, there is a likelihood 
that citizenship may be allocated so as to artificially preserve 
religious homogeneity, and thereby religious hegemony.49 A
secularism that encompasses this second principled commitment 
ensures that religious minorities are not permanently excluded from 
membership in the polity and, therefore, ensures the possibility and 
continuation of religious plurality. 
46. Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration 
and Access to Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 53, 67 (2010).
47. See id. at 64.
48. For example, the Constitution of Maldives restricts citizenship to 
Muslims. Section 9(d) states that a non-Muslim may not become a citizen of 
Maldives. See Dheena Hussain, Functional Translation of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Maldives 2008, http://www.maldivesinfo.gov.mv/home/upload/downloads/
Compilation.pdf [perma.cc/7SHC-AHV9].
49. Religious homogeneity is, of course, often a social myth as differences 
in opinion and practice will exist even within a seemingly religiously homogenous 
society. 
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C. Third Characteristic: Recognizing an Individual Right to 
Religious Freedom 
The third characteristic is that the state must recognize an 
individual right to religious freedom. A state that does not even 
recognize that individuals have a right to religious freedom cannot in 
any sense of the word protect religious freedom.
There are many stages in the evolution of religious freedom 
protection and a key historical event affecting this evolution is the 
resolution of religious wars in Europe in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.50 The 1555 Peace of Augsburg established the 
right of rulers to determine the religion of his realm under the 
principle of cuius regio eius religio (“whose realm–his religion”).51
This was later extended in the Peace of Westphalia, which 
established that persons could practice, in private, religions that are 
not the established religion of their countries of residence. It made it 
possible for individuals to privately confess and practice a religion 
that is not the established religion of the king or prince.52 Article 
XXVIII states: 
[A]ll others of the said Confession of Augsburg, who shall demand it, 
shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches 
at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others 
chosen for this purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, 
preaching the Word of God.53
The scope of this freedom was, in reality, rather narrow. In 
practice, it only extended to the freedom of Protestants to exercise 
their religion freely in Catholic states and vice versa. Notably, this 
being a treaty signed between states, the concession to individual 
freedom was made as an inter-state commitment, rather than one 
providing direct rights to the individual. Indeed, the individual only 
obtained rights independent of states after the rise of human rights, 
which sought to pierce the veil of state sovereignty in favor of the 
50. W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION:
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 78 (2010). 
51. While broadly stated, the scope in practice is rather narrow; it meant 
that the princes within the Holy Roman Empire would have the right to choose 
Lutheran Protestantism as the sole religion of his principality. See HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II 50-51 (2003). 
52. See DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 50, at 78.
53. See Treaty of Westphalia art. XXVIII, Oct. 24, 1648, AVALON PROJECT:
YALE L. SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp [https://perma.cc/
5ZMP-HLJS] (last visited May 1, 2017).
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protection of individuals directly by the world community.54
Nonetheless, what secularism in a non-liberal state requires is this 
basic recognition that a person’s religious affiliation is not dictated 
by the state and that there is a right to self-identify with a religion.55
D. Fourth Characteristic: Religious Freedom as a Public Good 
Whereas religious freedom or free exercise of religion is 
protected in the liberal state as part of the basic autonomy of the 
individual, religious freedom in a non-liberal state is justified on 
different grounds and thus may entail different features. Professors 
Sajó and Uitz suggest that “outside of liberal constitutionalism, 
freedom of religion [is] a matter of group protection in the form of 
group rights.”56 If this is a claim that non-liberal constitutions do not 
recognize an individual right to religious freedom, this may be 
putting the case a little too far. While a non-liberal constitution may 
value individual rights less than liberal constitutions, it does not 
necessarily reject the possibility of individual rights. Under such a 
constitution, individual rights are more likely to be viewed as being 
embedded within a community. Therefore, this requires greater 
attention to the balancing of individual rights against the rights of the 
group in light of broader social considerations. Under a non-liberal 
constitution, rights are not viewed as fundamental or trumps over 
group or public interests, and thus some may not view them as rights, 
strictly speaking.57 But the fact that “rights” could be considered 
important factors to be weighed against group/public interests should 
be taken into account in valuing their relevance and significance. 
Nonetheless, insofar as religious freedom is justified on the basis of 
its value to broader community interests, this is a plausible and likely 
argument within non-liberal entities. 
One important justification for religious freedom on non-liberal 
grounds is the need for peaceful coexistence of different religious 
54. DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 50, at 79. 
55. One critique for which I am grateful is the interrelationship and overlap 
among at least the first three characteristics. Specifically, one might see the second 
and/or third characteristics as manifestations of non-domination, rather than separate 
characteristics. I take this critique seriously and will endeavor to provide greater 
conceptual clarity in my next article developing this idea of secularism. 
56. András Sajó & Renáta Uitz, Freedom of Religion, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 909, 911. 
57. Dworkin, of course, is famous for conceptualizing rights as “trumps.” 
See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 272. 
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groups under conditions of religious plurality. Protecting religious 
freedom would promote peaceful coexistence because when religious 
individuals and groups have relatively high levels of autonomy to 
profess and practice their religion, they are less likely to be 
dissatisfied and will find it in their interest to preserve social peace. 
This understanding of religious freedom gives religion a contingent 
value, since religion is valued as part of a common good. This is 
non-liberal since freedom of religion is not valued for its 
“importance to the human condition” but because of its “utility to 
social organization.”58
E. Limitations 
There are limits to peaceful coexistence as a basis for religious 
freedom since it is a pragmatic59 form of toleration. Here, I identify 
two of them. Firstly, protecting religious freedom as a function of 
ensuring peaceful coexistence gives religious freedom instrumental, 
rather than intrinsic, value, and this means that protecting religious 
beliefs and practice are not valued for its own sake. The non-liberal 
state is therefore more likely to regulate religion where such 
regulations are deemed necessary or conducive for peaceful 
coexistence.
There are two areas of religious activity that are most likely to 
be subject to such regulation: first, offensive speech directed at other 
religious groups; and second, aggressive proselytization. On the first, 
offensive speech could include speech that directly undermines the 
religious tenets of another group or that directly attacks another 
religious group. The latter would be considered hate speech in some 
jurisdictions. On the second, aggressive proselytization could be 
regarded as inimical to peaceful coexistence because groups may feel 
threatened and see such activities as deliberate incursions 
undermining their religious community. 
Secondly, protecting religious freedom in service of the public 
interest in peaceful coexistence means that religious freedom is 
subordinated to broader public interests, especially public order. 
Consequently, critics argue that religious persecution is not 
incompatible with and may serve the preservation of peace.60
58. Brownstein, supra note 24, at 95.
59. See Sajó & Uitz, supra note 56, at 913.
60. See Waldron, supra note 26, at 61; see also Sajó & Uitz, supra note 56,
at 913-14.
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However, I argue that religious persecution represents a form of 
social disorder and would, in any case, not constitute peaceful 
coexistence. 
III. THE CASE STUDY OF SINGAPORE 
To tease out the implications of the above argument, I will now 
examine the experience of Singapore as an example of a country that 
complies with the three requirements and which conceptualizes 
religious freedom as necessary for peaceful coexistence of different 
religious groups. The purpose of discussing Singapore is also to 
illustrate some of the limitations of this non-liberal approach in 
protecting religious freedom. 
A. Social and Constitutional Background on State and Religion in 
Singapore 
Singapore is a non-liberal constitutional order that proclaims to 
be secular but whose Constitution permits state entanglement with 
religion. A Pew Research Report ranked Singapore as the most 
religiously diverse country of the 232 countries studied.61
Singapore’s high score reflects the spread of various religions across 
its population. About a third of Singapore’s population is Buddhist 
(34%), while 18% is Christian, 16% is religiously unaffiliated, 14% 
is Muslim, 5% is Hindu, less than 1% is Jewish, with the remainder 
belonging to folk or traditional religions (2%) or to other religions 
(making up 10% as a group).62 There is widespread assumption, 
reflected in state policy, that there is a strong correlation between 
61. See Global Religious Diversity: Half of the Most Religiously Diverse 
Countries Are in Asia-Pacific Region, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://
www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/global-religious-diversity/#fn-20155-2 [https://perma.cc/
R5ET-W2FF]. The study scores countries per the percentage of each country’s 
population that belongs to the eight major religious groups as of 2010. The closer a 
country comes to having equal shares of the eight groups, the higher its religious 
diversity score. See id.
62. See id. This tracks closely, though not identically, with the breakdown 
in the 2010 Population Census, which records the following statistics: Buddhism 
(33.3%), Christianity (18.3%), no religion (17.0%), Islam (14.7%), Taoism (10.9%), 
Hinduism (5.1%), and other religions (0.7%). See Census of Population 2010 
Statistical Release 1: Demographic Characteristics, Education, Language and 
Religion, SING. DEP’T STAT. (2010), http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/cop2010/census_
2010_release1/findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ3D-K944].
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race and religion. However, while nearly all among the ethnic 
minority Malays are Muslims, the other ethnic groups are, in fact, 
more religiously diverse. For instance, in its most recent 
International Religious Freedom Report, the U.S. government 
estimates that 74.2% of Singapore’s population is ethnic Chinese, 
13.3% ethnic Malay, 9.2% ethnic Indian, and 3.3% other, including 
Eurasians.63 However, among the ethnic Indians, 59% are Hindu, 
22% are Muslim, and 13% are Christian.64 The ethnic Chinese 
population includes Buddhists (43%), Taoists (14.4%), and 
Christians (20.1%).65
Despite apparently liberal roots in its constitutional design,66
Singapore has never sought to present itself as a liberal democracy in 
practice. In fact, it expressly adopts a national ideology that 
subordinates individual autonomy to community and social goods. 
For instance, one of the five governments initiated Shared Values, 
which serves as a national ideology and states the following: “Nation 
before community and society above self.”67 It has been variously 
described as authoritarian,68 “fundamentally undemocratic,”69 and 
63. See International Religious Freedom Report for 2015: Singapore, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper 
[https://perma.cc/DU4T-6YJZ] (last visited May 1, 2017).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. For instance, the Singapore Constitution contains a bill of rights (Part 
IV, Fundamental Liberties) that traces its genealogical roots to the American 
Constitution. It was “derived, with modifications, from Part II of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia (1957),” which in turn was based on the Indian 
Constitution that was heavily influenced by the American Constitution. See Thio Li-
ann, A Bill of Rights Without a “Rights Culture”? Fundamental Liberties and 
Constitutional Adjudication in Singapore, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR P.K. TRIPATHI 303, 308 (Mahendra P. Singh 
ed., 2d ed. 2006); see also Anthony Lester QC, The Overseas Trade in the American 
Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 544 (1988). 
67. Singapore adopted a statement of five Shared Values in 1991. The other 
four Shared Values are 1) family as a basic unit of society; 2) community support 
and respect for the individual; 3) consensus, not conflict; and 4) racial and religious 
harmony. See Tin Seng Lim, Shared Values, NAT’L LIBR. BOARD, http://
eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_542_2004-12-18.html [https://perma.cc/
25YQ-TE3U].
68. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE 
AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 34 (2010).
69. Sebastian Reyes, Singapore’s Stubborn Authoritarianism, HARV. POL.
REV. (Sept. 29, 2015, 11:09 AM), http://harvardpolitics.com/world/singapores-
stubborn-authoritarianism/ [https://perma.cc/8RLP-3CJV].
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more recently “competitively authoritarian[].”70 In 2015, it ranked 
74th on the Democracy Index, categorized as a flawed democracy.71
Indeed, most recently, Mark Tushnet studied Singapore as a prime 
case study of “authoritarian constitutionalism,” which he describes as 
a regime where “liberal freedoms are protected at an intermediate 
level, and elections are reasonably free and fair.”72
While it does not claim to be liberal, Singapore does self-
identify as a secular state, even though the Constitution does not 
contain any explicit statements to this effect.73 The state often 
proclaims that it practices “neutrality” under the terms of its 
secularism.74 However, Singapore is not neutral, strictly speaking.
While it does not take any truth-position with regard to religion, it 
nonetheless regulates religion and expresses preferences for 
particular theological positions (see below). Singapore’s highest 
court, the Court of Appeal, affirmed in 1994 that Singapore’s 
Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of religion, and thus, 
the government could validly regulate religion.75 Furthermore, the 
Constitution, at Article 152(1), asserts that “[i]t shall be the 
responsibility of the Government constantly to care for the interests 
of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore.”76 This 
presumably could be used to justify regulation of religion as caring
for the interests of religious minorities. The Constitution is even 
more specific with regard to Muslims/Islam. Article 152(2) explicitly 
70. Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 52 (2002).
71. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy 
in an Age of Anxiety 1, 6 (2016) http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?
campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015 [https://perma.cc/ENE9-XSB9].
72. Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
391, 396 (2015).
73. See Jaclyn L. Neo, Secular Constitutionalism in Singapore: Between 
Equality and Hierarchy, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 431, 431 (2016) (showing that I 
have argued in an earlier article that Singapore nonetheless defies a clear secular 
constitutionalist characterization, because it does not conform to the secular 
constitutionalism as separation paradigm since the state directly regulates religion).
74. For example, in 1992, then Minister for Information and the Arts 
George Yeo stated that “Singapore’s government is secular, but it is certainly not 
atheistic. It is neutral.” BG Yeo, Government Is Secular, Not Atheistic, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), Oct. 8, 1989, at 2; see also Thio Li-ann, Religion in the Public Sphere 
of Singapore: Wall of Division or Public Square?, in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 77 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2007). 
75. See Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 SLR 662 
(Sing.).
76. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Dec. 22, 1965, part XIII, 
art. 152(1).
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requires the government to “recognise the special position of the 
Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore,” and “to 
protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, 
educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the 
Malay language.”77 In addition, Article 153 of the Constitution could 
be read as obligating the legislature, using the language of “shall,” to 
“by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious affairs and 
for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters relating 
to the Muslim religion.”78 This “law” took the form of the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), which the Legislature 
passed in 1966 establishing the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (the 
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore or MUIS, for short) and 
Syariah courts for Muslims.79
Nonetheless, the secularism that Singapore practices complies 
with the requirements that I have identified earlier. First, it rejects 
political dominance by any religion. For instance, Singapore’s 
founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stressed at the inaugural 
session of Singapore’s first Parliament that Singapore has “a vested 
interest in multi-racialism and a secular State.”80 By this, he means a 
rejection of the idea that one group can “assert its dominance over 
the other on the basis of one race, one language, one religion.”81
Secondly, citizenship is not conditioned by religious identity. 
The Constitution prescribes a religion-neutral basis for attaining 
citizenship, which is by one of the four routes of birth, descent, 
registration, and naturalization.82 While the ability to speak the 
national language is required for naturalization and the ability to 
speak one of the official languages is required for registration, there 
77. Id. art. 152(2); see also Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966,
reprinted in TAN, YEO, LEE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN MALAYSIA & SINGAPORE, app. 
D, para. 34 (Kevin YL Tan & Thio Li-ann eds., 2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added) 
(showing that the provision was preserved in almost identical terms from the 
preamble to the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council 1958 under which 
Singapore attained full internal self-government and thereafter as part of the state 
Constitution as part of the Federation of Malaysia. The Wee Commission 
recommended the retention of article 89(2) (now article 152(2)), which obligates the 
government to protect and promote the religious interests of the Malays). 
78. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Dec. 22, 1965, part XIII, 
art. 153.
79. Administration of Muslim Law Act (Act No 27/1966) (Sing.).
80. 24 Parl. Deb. col. 89, 114 (emphasis added) (statement of Lee Kuan 
Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore).
81. Id. (emphasis added). 
82. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Dec. 22, 1965, part X, 
art. 120.
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are no further substantive requirements for either mode of attaining 
citizenship. Furthermore, since citizenship was available to persons 
of all religious backgrounds when Singapore became independent, 
citizenship is passed by birth and descent to children of all families 
from all religious groups. This is not just an implicit commitment to 
allocating citizenship on non-religious grounds. There is, in fact, an 
explicit commitment, as reflected in Singapore’s national pledge. 
The Pledge, recited daily by schoolchildren, asserts an idea of 
citizenship as “one united people, regardless of race, language or 
religion.”83
Thirdly, the Constitution formally recognizes and guarantees 
religious freedom to profess and practice one’s religion. Article 
15(1) of the Singapore Constitution guarantees that “[e]very person 
has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate 
it.”84 It is an expressly qualified right as Article 15(4) serves as a
limitation clause stating, “This Article does not authorise any act 
contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or
morality.”85 While this provision is included in the chapter in the 
Constitution titled “Fundamental Liberties,”86 judicial and political
interpretation of this provision has tended to treat it not as a 
fundamental, as in trumping, right. Using the categories identified by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal of four types of rights—fundamental, 
preferential, coequal, and subsidiary87—it should be noted that some 
earlier cases have portrayed religious freedom as subsidiary to 
certain fundamental state interests.88 A recent case has been less 
definitive and could be interpreted as viewing religious freedom as a 
co-equal right, where there is no presumption in favor of either rights 
83. National Pledge, SING. NAT’L HERITAGE BOARD (emphasis added),
http://www.nhb.gov.sg/resources/national-symbols/national-pledge [https://perma.cc/
V353-S6GJ] (last visited May 1, 2017). 
84. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Dec. 22, 1965, part IV, 
art. 15(1).
85. Id. art. 15(4) (emphasis added). 
86. Id. part IV.
87. Review Publ’g Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 (Sing.),
paras. 286-89. 
88. See Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 SLR 662, 684 
(Sing.) where the High Court stated that “[t]he sovereignty, integrity and unity of 
Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything, 
including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter to these 
objectives must be restrained.” 
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or interests.89 By treating religious freedom as a co-equal right, the 
laws and governmental actions restricting it would be subject to an 
“ultimate balancing test.”90
B. Regulating Religion for Peaceful Coexistence: Religious 
Harmony 
Fourthly, religious freedom is intertwined with the public good 
of peaceful coexistence among different religious groups in 
Singapore. The proposed requirements of minimalist secularism 
ensure that there is space for religious freedom by diverse religious 
groups. To be clear, what accounts for the relatively positive levels 
of religious freedom in Singapore is a complex question. Here, I 
want to emphasize that one crucial factor is that religious freedom is 
conceptualized as part of the common good. More specifically, it is 
seen as necessary for peaceful coexistence of religious groups. In 
Singapore’s political discourse, this is denoted by the term “religious 
harmony.” This religious harmony is sometimes referred to as racial 
and religious harmony due to the asserted strong correlation between 
race and religion; although as the demographic breakdown 
mentioned above suggests that the correlation between race and 
religion is not present for most ethnic groups. Nonetheless, “racial 
and religious harmony” is entrenched as one of the five Shared 
Values the government proposed in 1988 as part of the national state 
ideology and could be considered to have been elevated to a quasi-
constitutional doctrine.91 Religious harmony often justifies state 
control of religion; however, it is not ipso facto inimical to religious 
freedom. Indeed, the range of state regulations that exist in 
Singapore to maintain religious harmony has been used with some 
circumspection. These are the Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Act,92 the Sedition Act,93 and the Penal Code.94 Instead, the 
government prefers to employ informal channels to directly and 
89. See Vijaya Kumar s/o Rajendran & Ors v Attorney-General [2015] 
SGHC 244. 
90. Review Publ’g Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 (Sing.), 
para 289. Coequal rights differs from preferential rights in that in the latter, 
preference is given to the right such that the balances are tilted in its favor but could 
be outweighed under certain conditions. Id. para. 287. 
91. Lim, supra note 67.
92. Ch. 167A (2001). 
93. Ch. 290 § 3 (2013). 
94. Ch. 224, ch. XV (2008). 
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actively manage inter-religious relations. I will briefly describe these 
laws and how they have been used. 
1. Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (“MRHA”)
The MRHA was passed in 1990 in response to the perceived 
risk of government critics exploiting organized religion to advance 
their political aims.95 The stated purpose of the law is to prevent the 
mixing of religion and politics.96 The law seeks to proscribe attempts 
by leaders, members, and teachers of religious groups from 
supposedly employing organized religion to cause hostility among 
religious groups as well as to challenge the government. Under the 
law, the Minister for Home Affairs is empowered to issue an order to 
restrain a religious leader or a member of a religious institution for 
up to two years from addressing a particular topic or theme that 
promotes a political cause, is subversive, excites disaffection against 
the state, and/or causes hostility among religious groups under the 
guise of religious speech. If this restraining order were flouted, the 
person against whom the order was made would be subject to 
criminal sanctions. Notably, this law imposes additional burdens on 
religious leaders (as well as those in positions of authority/influence 
within religious organizations), and not on persons in general. The 
MRHA is highly intrusive since it is specifically aimed at restraining 
speech made from the pulpit, i.e., within the confines of religious 
institutions and places of worship. This is especially since the 
MRHA grants the Minister wide discretionary powers to define what 
would constitute an act falling within the prohibited sphere of action. 
The government justifies this intrusion by arguing that singling out 
persons of influence within religious organizations for further 
regulatory control is legitimate because of their special position. This 
is, it is contended, analogous to how judges and civil servants are 
restrained from active politics.97
The MRHA is not anti-religion and, despite its disapproval of 
mixing religion with politics, the state has been careful to state that 
this does not delegitimize all forms of political participation by 
95. Singapore Parliamentary Reports, col. 636 (Oct. 6, 1989). 
96. See Thio Li-ann, The Elected President and the Legal Control of 
Government, in MANAGING POLITICAL CHANGE IN SINGAPORE: THE ELECTED 
PRESIDENCY 129 (Kevin Tan & Lam Peng Er eds., 1997). 
97. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, WHITE PAPER:
MAINTENANCE OF RELIGIOUS HARMONY, 1989, Cmd. 21, at 6 [hereinafter MRHA 
White Paper].
Religious Freedom & Secularism in a Non-Liberal State 357
religion.98 There are two areas that are considered legitimate forms of 
political participation by religious individuals and groups. First, the 
law does not prohibit persons with religious beliefs from 
participating in the democratic process as individual citizens.99 In the 
White Paper accompanying the law,100 the government explicitly 
recognized that it is not possible or desirable to completely 
compartmentalize the minds of voters into secular and religious 
halves and ensure that only the secular mind influences political 
behavior.101 This contrasts with a common assumption in liberal 
thought that a person’s religious beliefs and views could be 
bracketed from their participation in democratic politics as citizens. 
Secondly, even for religious groups and institutions, the law does not 
prohibit them from expressing their opinions publicly on government 
policy qua group. In response to a criticism by the Archbishop of the 
Catholic Church that religion has a legitimate place in political 
discourse in Singapore and that religious citizens must be able to 
voice their concerns about government policies when there are moral 
or religious implications on society, the government conceded that 
such participation would not be prohibited under the MRHA.102
Thus, while religions and religious groups are not viewed as 
inherently hostile to politics or society, their value is contingent on 
their contribution to society. This is evident even in the MRHA 
White Paper, which stresses that religion is a “positive factor” in 
society and that religious groups have made, and will continue to 
make, major contributions to the nation in a variety of educational, 
community, and social functions.103
98. JOSEPH B. TAMNEY, THE STRUGGLE OVER SINGAPORE’S SOUL: WESTERN 
MODERNIZATION AND ASIAN CULTURE 32-33 (1996). 
99. See MRHA White Paper, supra note 97, at 6. 
100. A White Paper is a “policy document issued by the Government to 
explain or discuss matters” and is “often presented for debate in Parliament.” 
Parliamentary Glossary, PARLIAMENT SING., https://www.parliament.gov.sg/
publications/w [https://perma.cc/E3LM-UKU5] (last visited May 1, 2017). Note that 
Thio regards the White Paper as containing “soft constitutional law,” which are non-
binding rules. See Thio Li-ann, Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian 
Constitutional Democracies, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 766, 793 (2010).
101. See MRHA White Paper, supra note 97, at 6. 
102. Archbishop and Mufti Call for Clearer Definition of ‘Politics’, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 11, 1990, at 20. 
103. See MRHA White Paper, supra note 97, at 6. 
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2. Sedition Act 
Besides the MRHA, another law that has been employed to 
regulate religious activity to preserve religious harmony is the 
Sedition Act.104 This law is not, strictly speaking, targeted at religion 
or religious groups. However, because “seditious tendency” is 
defined as including a tendency to “promote feelings of ill-will and 
hostility between different races or classes of the population of 
Singapore,” it has been used to proscribe religious speech and 
conduct in some instances.105 In addition, where individuals use 
religious platforms to oppose the government, their conduct could 
also fall within one of the other definitions of seditious tendency 
such as bringing the government into hatred or contempt or exciting 
disaffection against it.106 The Sedition Act has been used against 
online speech inciting hatred against Malay-Muslims107 as well as
against zealous Christian proselytizers who targeted Malay-Muslims 
for evangelism. For instance, in the 2009 case of PP v. Ong Kian 
Cheong, a Christian couple had mailed Chick Publications tracts 
calling Islam a false religion to recipients whom they identified as 
Malay-Muslims.108 According to the couple, their actions were 
104. Ch. 290 § 3(1)(e) (2013). 
105. Id. This is despite the fact that religion is not mentioned in the Sedition 
Act; instead, it is implied into the reference to race whereby race is conflated with 
religion. Id. § 3(2)(d).
106. Section 3 states:
(1) A seditious tendency is a tendency––
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the 
Government; 
(b) to excite the citizens of Singapore or the residents in Singapore to 
attempt to procure in Singapore, the alteration, otherwise than by lawful 
means, of any matter as by law established; 
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the 
administration of justice in Singapore; 
(d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the citizens of Singapore or 
the residents in Singapore; 
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or 
classes of the population of Singapore.
Id. § 3.
107. Pub. Prosecutor v. Koh Song Huat Benjamin and Another [2005] SGDC 
272 (Sing.).
108. Pub. Prosecutor v. Ong Kian Cheong and Another [2009] SGDC 163 
(Sing.). The tracts also targeted Roman Catholics. Those mentioned include “Who is 
Allah,” “The Pilgrimage,” “Allah Had no Son,” “The Sky Lighter,” “Man in Black,” 
“Are Roman Catholics Christians,” “Back from the Dead,” “The Beast,” “Why is
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motivated by a desire “to evangelize so that people will come to 
realize the saving grace of Jesus Christ.”109 They were charged for 
contravening the Sedition Act,110 convicted, and received a custodial 
sentence of sixteen weeks each.111 The District Court concluded that 
“Christian publications or tracts denigrating Islam, its followers or 
the Catholic Church and other religions will undoubtedly promote 
feelings of ill-will or hostility between Muslims, Malays, Roman 
Catholics and people of other religions.”112
This case shows clearly the outer limits of religious freedom 
under non-liberal constraints. As mentioned above, one area in which 
religious freedom is likely to be restrained in a non-liberal setting is 
where religious activity is likely to affect other religious groups. 
Religious proselytization is one such area.113 While there is no legal 
restrictions on religious proselytization, proselytizing efforts may run 
the risk of offending other religious communities and be considered 
seditious, creating ill-will and hostility between different religious 
groups. Nonetheless, proselytization still occurs within these 
constraints and there is no legal restriction against the right to choose 
one’s religion or to change one’s religion in Singapore. 
3. Direct Non-Legal Regulation 
The government’s direct and judicious regulations of inter-
religious and state-religious relations are more impactful and 
important than the MRHA and Sedition Act. Singapore’s
government engages in active bilateral or multilateral monitoring and 
mediation. This non-legal approach tries to be accommodative 
insofar as it allows for the consideration of various non-
universalizable considerations and encourages mutually acceptable 
resolutions. This accommodative regulatory technique is one that has 
been used by the Singapore government since independence and to 
Mary Crying,” “Squatters,” and “The Little Bride.” The focus in this case however 
was on the tracts targeting Islam. Id. para. 4.
109. Id. para. 41. 
110. Id. para. 1, 6. They were also charged and convicted under the 
Undesirable Publications Act (Ch. 338). Id.
111. Id. para. 85-86. They each served eight weeks of imprisonment because 
two of the sentences run concurrently. Id.
112. Id. para. 77.
113. For a critical analysis on issues of religious freedom and religious 
propagation that the case of Ong Kian Cheong raises, see Thio Li-ann, Contentious 
Liberty: Regulating Religious Propagation in a Multi-Religious Secular Democracy,
2010 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 484, 499-501 (2010). 
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great effect. When an issue arises that has the propensity to affect the 
relationship between religious groups or between religious groups 
and the state, the government will intervene. What is interesting, as 
was noted earlier, is that the first line of intervention is usually a 
form of mediation. Thio explains this in terms of relational 
constitutionalism. She argues that this approach views law as 
“inappropriate where the objective is not to vindicate rights or punish 
a wrongdoer, which has alienating effects, but to manage social 
tensions in a reconciliatory fashion.”114
Direct non-legal regulation is further reflected in the 
promulgation of the Declaration of Religious Harmony, issued in 
2003, which closely involved the national corporate bodies of the 
dominant religions in Singapore.115 The Declaration is a “non-
legislative document.”116 It was the result of a government initiative 
but was developed by various religious leaders.117 The intention 
behind the document was to lay down ground rules for religious 
conduct. Tan points out that this was “in essence an attempt to exert 
moral suasion on the leaders and believers of the various faiths to 
practice moderation in exercising their beliefs.”118 Consequently, 
while the Declaration does not contain binding legal rules, its main 
114. Thio Li-ann, Relational Constitutionalism and the Management of 
Religious Disputes: The Singapore ‘Secularism with a Soul’ Model, 1 OXFORD J.L.
& RELIGION 446, 448 (2012) (emphasis added). 
115. The range of consultation was comprehensive and fairly representative, 
with those involved including the Hindu Endowments Board, the Inter-Religious 
Organisation, MUIS, the National Council of Churches of Singapore, the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Sikh Advisory Board, the Singapore Buddhist Federation, the 
Singapore Council of Christian Churches, the Taoist Federation Singapore, the Thye 
Hua Kwan Moral Society, and the Red Swastika Society. The Declaration is 
portrayed as the product of a consensus among these national bodies, with the 
government’s approval, as this presumably serves to legitimize the document. See, 
e.g., Declaration of Religious Harmony, INTER-RELIGIOUS ORG., SING., http://
iro.sg/about/declaration/ [https://perma.cc/QR8C-9CA6] (last visited May 1, 2017).
116. Kelly Ng, S’poreans ‘Risk Taking Religious, Racial Harmony for 
Granted’, TODAY, SING. (May 1, 2015), http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/
sporeans-risk-taking-religious-racial-harmony-granted?singlepage=true [https://perma.cc/
L6UF-U792].
117. Id.; see also Explanation on the Declaration by the Religious Harmony 
Working Committee, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES
http://www.iccc.org.sg/rhwcommittee.html (last visited May 14, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/47L2-QPGD]. 
118. Eugene K.B. Tan, Keeping God in Place, in LAI AH ENG, RELIGIOUS 
DIVERSITY IN SINGAPORE, 55, 73 (2008); see also Lai Ah Eng, The Inter-Religious 
Organization of Singapore, in LAI AH ENG, RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN SINGAPORE,
605, 625 (2008).
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purpose is to impose a framework for self-regulation among religious 
groups. 
C. Religious Freedom in Singapore
Despite the range of legal control, there is evidence of fairly 
high levels of religious freedom in Singapore. For instance, for 
several consecutive years, the United States State Department 
determined that the Singapore “constitution and laws and policies
provide for religious freedom, subject to restrictions,”119 and that “the 
[Singapore] government generally respected the freedom of most 
religious groups in practice.”120 The main issues flagged in the 
reports are the prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to 
perform compulsory military service, legal restrictions on actions 
perceived to be detrimental to religious harmony, and the prohibition 
of the wearing of hijabs by certain public sector professionals and in 
public schools.121
Furthermore, despite Professors Grim and Finke arguing that 
data shows that “government restriction of religious freedom holds a 
powerful and robust relationship with violent religious persecution” 
and classified Singapore as a country that views religion as a threat, 
they scored Singapore low on religious persecution while recording 
high levels of government regulations.122 They note that there are 
fairly high average levels of government restriction of religion (7.5 
119. International Religious Freedom Report for 2015: Singapore, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=
2015&dlid=256139 [https://perma.cc/DU4T-6YJZ] (last visited May 1, 2017).
120. International Religious Freedom Report for 2013: Singapore, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2013religiousfreedom/#wrapper
[https://perma.cc/GM5J-PHA8] (last visited May 1, 2017). The reports for at least 
2011 to 2013 used these terms “generally respected.” The language changed to more 
ambivalent terms in 2014 and 2015, though without necessarily reflecting any 
change in governmental practice. See International Religious Freedom Report for 
2015, supra note 119.
121. See International Religious Freedom Report for 2015, supra note 119;
International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, supra note 120. I must here 
clarify that I do not want to undervalue the significance of these restrictions on 
religious practice. What I am merely trying to point out is that in spite of some of 
these restrictions, one can and does enjoy fairly high levels of religious freedom in 
the country. 
122. See BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED 79 
(2011). In a wide-ranging study, Grim and Finke argue that “religious restrictions—
composed of social and government restrictions—help explain violent religious 
persecution, which is a specific form of social and civil conflict.” Id. at 74.
362 Michigan State Law Review 2017
on a scale of 0-10 with 10 being the highest) in Singapore, but the 
average level of persecution they recorded is quite low (3.0 on a 
scale of 0-10 with 10 being the highest).123 Interestingly, Grim and 
Finke’s study also shows extremely low levels of average social 
restriction of religion (1.3 on a scale of 0-10 with 10 being the 
highest).124 This contrasts with China, which served as a prime case 
study of a country with high levels of religious persecution (10) 
correlating with high levels of government restriction of religion 
(8.3) and fairly high levels of social restrictions (4.6) of 
persecution.125
In addition, in a recent analysis by Professor Jonathan Fox on 
freedom of religion in Southeast Asia, Singapore scored relatively 
better on his religious freedom measure than the average scores in 
Southeast Asia on religious discrimination, religious regulation, and 
support for religion.126 To be sure, Professor Fox did point out that 
Singapore is “not more religiously free than Western democracies,” 
but he also observes that Singapore shows promise in terms of its 
religious freedom record.127
D. Limitations of a Social Peace Approach to Religious Freedom 
The key to understanding the seeming contradiction between 
fairly high levels of religious freedom with high levels of formal and 
informal regulation of religion lies in the conceptualization of 
religious freedom as a function of racial–religious harmony in 
Singapore. The state recognizes that allowing religious individuals 
and groups to profess and practice their religion is important to 
maintaining social peace and order. The state practices a form of 
secularism that is committed to the requirements that I have 
identified above. The rejection of political dominance by any 
religion means that the state must show that it treats all religions 
even-handedly. Where some religions are given preferential 
treatment over others, these must be carefully justified. 
Indeed, the presence of government restrictions does not 
necessarily correlate with low levels of religious freedom since these 
restrictions may not be commonly enforced. For instance, while the 
123. Id. at 122.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Jonathan Fox, Freedom of Religion in Southeast Asia: An Empricial 
Analysis, 14 REV. FAITH & INT’L AFFAIRS 28, 33-35 (Winter 2016). 
127. Id. at 36, 38-39.
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MRHA gives the government wide discretion to restrict religious 
speech, it has never been formally invoked.128 Its impact lies in its 
legal potential rather than its actual use. Warnings that it would be 
used have been adequate.129 This could be seen as a chilling effect 
since religious leaders are likely to self-censor so as not to transgress 
the limits placed by the MRHA with respect to religious speech. 
Such a chilling effect, however, may not necessarily be undesirable 
since some forms of religious speech could be highly offensive to 
other religious groups and could undermine peaceful coexistence. 
As such, there are explicit limits to religious speech and 
religious activity in a non-liberal state. It bears noting that speech 
can be restricted even in self-avowedly liberal states whether by law 
(e.g., hate speech legislation) or through societal norms. Under non-
liberal conditions, religious freedom is protected as having 
instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value and is more likely to be 
balanced (and subjected) to public order considerations. These limits 
manifest themselves in two ways in the Singapore context. 
1. Prioritization of (Secular) Public Interests over Religious 
Freedom 
First, the balance between religious freedom and competing 
public interests are almost always resolved in favor of the latter. The 
cases involving conscientious objection claims by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses against compulsory military service illustrate this 
principle.130 For example, in the 1994 case of Chan Hiang Leng 
Colin v. PP, the High Court established the parameters of religious 
freedom protection under the Constitution. The case affirms the 
distinction between beliefs and practice. While confirming that 
constitutionally, “[R]eligious beliefs ought to have proper 
protection,” the Court nonetheless held that “actions undertaken or 
flowing from such beliefs must conform with the general law relating 
128. See Thio, supra note 96, at 129.
129. Examples include the following: instances where religious leaders have 
been warned include where an Islamic leader urged Muslims to vote for Muslim 
candidates during the 1991 General Elections, where a Christian pastor criticized 
other faiths including Buddhism, Taoism, and Catholicism in 1992, and when an 
Islamic leader called a widespread Hindu belief that statues of their deity, Ganesha, 
could drink milk offerings the work of the devil in 1994. M. Nirmala, Govt Reins in 
Religious Leaders, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), May 12, 2001, at 1.
130. The Enlistment Act 1970 (Ch. 93 § 12 (2001)) required all male 
Singaporean citizens and permanent residents of age to perform compulsory military 
service. 
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to public order and social protection.”131 This distinction between the 
forum internum and forum externum is not unique to Singapore. 
What is distinctive and instructive of the Singapore approach is that 
the Court went on to subject both religious beliefs and practices to 
the “sovereignty, integrity, and unity of Singapore.”132 It declared that 
these “are undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution 
and anything, including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to 
run counter to these objectives must be restrained.”133 In Chan, some 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were charged for carrying out activities as a 
part of a deregistered society, which is a punishable offense.134 The 
government had deregistered the society of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
1972 (two years after compulsory military service was instituted) and 
banned all their publications.135 The High Court rejected their claim 
that the basis for deregistration was unconstitutional because it 
infringed upon their right to religious freedom, essentially holding 
that the administrative action was within constitutionally permissible 
limits.136
More recently, the outcome of a case involving an employment 
dispute between an employee and a church illustrates the 
prioritization of secular public interests over religious freedom in the 
form of church autonomy. In Faith Community Baptist Church v. 
Attorney-General,137 an employment tribunal ordered a church to 
compensate a former employee for dismissing her “without sufficient 
cause” during her pregnancy. The compensation amount of $7,000 in 
salary and maternity benefits was not very large, but the church 
objected on the basis that they were justified in dismissing the 
employee who had become pregnant through an adulterous affair. 
131. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Pub. Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR 209 (Sing.), 
paras. 64-66 (emphasis added). The High Court affirmed the executive’s position on 
this, which is that national/military service is a secular issue, and that permitting 
conscientious objection to compulsory service would cause the “whole system of 
universal National Service [to] come unstuck.” Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 662, 684 (emphasis added). 
134. Id.
135. This was by way of a gazette notification under the Undesirable 
Publications Act, which listed “All publications” which are “published or printed by 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society.” Gazette No. 123/72 (Jan. 14, 1972). 
136. The constitutionality of the publication ban was also challenged 
(unsuccessfully) when Jehovah’s Witness members were prosecuted for being in 
possession of banned materials in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Pub. Prosecutor [1994] 
3 SLR 662 (Sing.); Liong Kok Keng v. Pub. Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR 263 (Sing.); 
Ang Cheng Hai & Ors v. Pub. Prosecutor [1995] SGHC 97 (Sing.).
137. Originating Summons, CA88/2014, SUM3016/2014 (Sing. Ct. App.).
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While the employee was not part of the pastoral team, she assisted in 
the administration of the church’s marriage counseling course. She 
was initially counseled to end the adulterous affair but later refused. 
The church then dismissed her when she was seven months pregnant. 
This would contravene the Employment Act, which protects women 
from dismissals from the fourth month of pregnancy onwards unless 
it is made with sufficient cause.138
In contrast to the church’s position, the employment tribunal 
did not consider adultery to be a sufficient cause for termination. The 
Ministry of Manpower, which oversees the employment tribunal, 
took the position that employment law is a secular matter and that no 
religious considerations should be taken into account. It issued the 
following statement: “While each of us will have space to practise 
our religion, we have to preserve a common secular space for people 
with other beliefs, and employment is one of these secular spaces. 
Therefore, our employment legislation has to be secular.”139
This indicates that the secular public interest underlying the 
Employment Act—i.e., protection of women against pregnancy 
discrimination—trumps religious autonomy. Interestingly, the case 
was abandoned before it was fully litigated and therefore the 
Singapore courts have not yet had to adjudicate such a matter. 
2. Endorsement of Religious Views Conducive to Religious 
Harmony 
A second manifestation of the limits of protecting religious 
freedom as a function of maintaining peaceful coexistence among 
different religious groups is that the government’s regulatory control 
would inevitably be directed towards interpretation of religious 
doctrines that are most conducive to the state’s interests. Thus, the 
state would exercise its regulatory powers to prefer and endorse 
religious doctrines that are tolerant of difference. This requirement 
for religions to adopt doctrines that are most appropriate for the 
public good is reflected in the Declaration of Religious Harmony. A 
close juxtaposition of it against some religious doctrines, especially 
those concerning proselytization and salvational exclusivity, would 
show that the Declaration, in fact, demands religious groups to 
138. See Section 84 of the Employment Act (Cap 91, Rev Ed. 2009).
139. Toh Yong Chuan, Workplaces, Labour Laws Must Be Kept Secular: 
MOM, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.) (Aug. 28, 2013, 6:56 AM), 
http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/workplaces-labour-laws-must-be-kept-secular-
mom [https://perma.cc/FPJ2-223C].
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abandon parts of their doctrine which could be considered by some 
to be integral or essential. Specifically, the demand that religious 
groups “always [r]ecognise the secular nature of our State,” always
“respect each other’s freedom of religion,” and “ensure that religion 
will not be abused to create conflict and disharmony in Singapore”140
could conflict with certain religious doctrines. This is especially 
since the injunction is to always prioritize state goals over contrary 
religious doctrines and beliefs. 
Furthermore, the state endorses religious interpretations that do 
not overtly challenge those state policies that seek to ensure common 
spaces or that are more affirming of secular public interests. It does 
so by coopting religious associations. For instance, in the 2015 case 
of Madan Mohan Singh v. Attorney-General,141 the High Court relied 
on affidavits from two prominent members of the Sikh community 
that were filed in support of the government to reject a constitutional 
challenge to the Singapore prison services’ policy of only allowing 
Sikh inmates who had unshorn hair and beard at the point of 
admission to prison to keep them during the period of incarceration. 
Sikh inmates who had shorn hair and beard at the point of admission 
were generally not allowed to grow their hair and beard during the
period of incarceration. On this basis, the Sikh inmates were later 
distinguished as “practising Sikhs” versus “non-practising Sikhs.”142
The applicant, a volunteer Sikh religious counsellor, sought a 
quashing order against the labelling of Sikh prisoners as being either 
“practising” and/or “non-practising” and a declaration that his 
constitutional right to propagate his religion had been violated when 
the prison services did not renew his expired volunteer pass. The 
High Court struck out the claim on the basis that the applicant did 
not have locus standi to challenge the prison’s policy since he was 
not personally affected by the policy. But what was interesting is that 
a former chairman of the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association Sikh 
Aftercare (Counseling) (“SANA”) Services testified that SANA 
Services were “satisfied” with the manner in which the prison 
services handled matters relating to its hair grooming policy for Sikh 
inmates and that he was of the view that the prison services had 
“acted fairly and reasonably towards Sikh inmates.”143 The other 
deponent was the chairman of the Sikh Welfare Council’s Inmate 
140. Declaration of Religious Harmony, supra note 115.
141. [2015] SGHC 48 (Sing.).
142. Id.
143. Id. para. 56. 
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Counselling Subcommittee, who accepted that the hair grooming 
policy was “essential to maintaining safety, security and good order 
and discipline in prisons.”144 Furthermore, he testified that volunteer 
counsellors were “encouraged to focus more on strengthening the 
substance of Sikh inmates’ character and personality and less on 
strict adherence to the full requirements of the outward form required 
of a Sikh.”145 The government’s view of religion is further reflected 
in the deposition by a representative of the prison services who stated 
that the prison “recognises the potential of religious faith in 
facilitating and contributing to the rehabilitation of inmates” in his 
affidavit.146
Another example where religious constituents were encouraged 
to prefer doctrines that best suit state goals has to do with a well-
publicized disagreement between parents of four Muslim girls and 
public school authorities on wearing tudung (headscarves) in school. 
Singapore’s public schools prescribe standard uniforms for all 
students, and the Ministry of Education has a policy that requires 
students to refrain from wearing anything not forming part of the 
official school uniform. In January 2002, when four Muslim girls 
turned up at their primary schools wearing a tudung, they were 
suspended for contravening school policy.147 The parents threatened 
to sue, arguing violation of their freedom of religion. They received 
support from a significant segment of the Malay-Muslim 
community.148 Then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong intervened, 
publicly urging the parents not to alienate themselves by filing suit, 
which he characterized as a radical step.149 The matter was eventually 
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. para. 57.
147. Shahida Ariff, Third Tudung Girl Suspended, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), 
Feb. 12, 2002, at H3; see also KAMALUDEEN MOHAMED NASIR, ALEXIUS A. PEREIRA 
& BRYAN S. TURNER, MUSLIMS IN SINGAPORE: PIETY, POLITICS AND POLICIES (2010); 
Thio Li-ann, Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, 
Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs, SING. J. LEGAL STUD.
328, 355-56 (2002); Sharon Siddique, Islamic Dress Put in Perspective, STRAITS 
TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 20, 2002, at 15 (discussing the history of the tudung).
148. Seah Chiang Nee, Fears Rise as PAS Butts in, STAR (Malay.) (June 16, 
2002), http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020616st.htm [https://perma.cc/YX8Z-
EYXK].
149. Singapore Bars Headscarf Row Lawyer, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2255234.stm [https://perma.cc/RH47-TAWU];
see also Echoes of French Muslim Headscarf Debate Heard in Singapore, WORLD-
WIDE RELIGIOUS NEWS (Feb. 15, 2004), https://wwrn.org/articles/7507/ [https://
perma.cc/HC9C-RCBU].
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resolved through mediation involving MUIS and the Mufti. The 
President of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), 
Maarof Salleh, publicly urged the parents to send their children back 
to school without wearing the tudung. This was after consulting 
Mufti Syed Isa Semait, the highest Islamic authority in Singapore, 
whose position was that education was of a higher priority for 
Muslims.150 The matter was resolved primarily in favor of state 
interests. Some degree of accommodation however was provided as 
the students could opt to attend madrasah (religious schools).151 It is 
significant that MUIS and the Chief Mufti appealed to internal 
reasons, arguing that Islam regarded education as more important 
than for children to wear the tudung, thereby urging the parents not 
to jeopardize their daughters’ education.152 In the words of the Chief 
Mufti, “The no-tudung rule lasts only for a few hours when the 
pupils are in school. Education is more important.”153
Similarly, when Faith Baptist Community Church filed suit 
against the government in the employment dispute case discussed 
above, the National Council of Churches Singapore intervened and 
took the position that the issue should not be framed as a state-
church matter and sided with the government’s position that the case 
concerned the employer-employee relationship as regulated by the 
Employment Act and common law. It is not clear why the case was 
aborted, though the applicant Church issued a statement that it had 
come to understand the rationale for the Minister’s decision and that 
as “a responsible religious body/corporate citizen of this nation,” it 
accepted that “every decision of the Minister would depend on the 
unique facts of each case.”154 It did leave the door open for future 
150. See Ahmad Osman, Mufti Puts School First, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), 
Feb. 6, 2002, 4:25 PM, at 1; Zackaria Abdul Rahim, Mufti’s Choice: The Clash of 
Obligations Between Tudung and Education, TODAY (Sing.) (Feb. 6, 2002), at 2; see 
also account in Kevin Y.L. Tan, Law Religion, and the State in Singapore, 14 REV.
FAITH & INT’L AFFAIRS 65, 72 (Winter 2016). 
151. These schools, and a primary school run by the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church, are the only private schools that have not been absorbed into the national 
education system. There are six madrasah in Singapore offering primary and 
secondary Islamic education in Singapore, in addition to other madrasah attached to 
mosques and offering part-time or night classes. See Rose Ismail, Reforming 
Singapore’s Madrasah, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), May 19, 2000, at 12. 
152. See Mufti Puts School over Scarves, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2002), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/1804470.stm [https://perma.cc/49AY-JZT2].
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Official Statement on MOM Judicial Review, FAITH COMMUNITY 
BAPTIST CHURCH (May 18, 2015), http://www.fcbc.org.sg/about/news/official-
statement-mom-judicial-review [https://perma.cc/JQ9T-RPHP]. 
Religious Freedom & Secularism in a Non-Liberal State 369
conflicts by asserting that “moral conduct can in appropriate 
circumstances be governed by the terms of employment, where such 
conduct would affect the moral authority required in the performance 
of a job.”155
CONCLUSION 
In a 2013 article in The Economist discussing the desirability of 
blasphemy laws, the article aptly observed that: “It’s true that 
punishing blasphemy won’t secure social peace, but rescinding all 
blasphemy laws, and robustly defending everyone’s right to insult, 
sneer and abuse, won’t necessarily get you social peace either.”156
This is a position that rightly rejects the assumption that values and 
methods commonly advocated under liberal-secularism are always 
the best way to ensure religious freedom and social peace. The type 
of secular but non-liberal state that I proposed above could provide 
rather robust protection of religious freedom in guaranteeing 
peaceful coexistence among different groups. 
In the example that I presented in the Introduction concerning 
the use of loudspeakers to broadcast religious services, the liberal-
secular state’s commitment to neutrality would not allow it to 
directly intervene. It must therefore either impose facially neutral 
laws, despite any discriminatory intent or impact.157 A secular but 
non-liberal state’s commitment to religious harmony, like in 
Singapore may, however, open the door for an alternative regulatory 
approach. Indeed, when this matter came up, albeit with respect to 
Buddhists seeking permission to use loudspeakers to broadcast their 
religious services, the regulatory response was a non-legal one. 
Concerned that granting the request might lead to other requests 
from churches, synagogues, and Buddhist/Taoist temples and that 
this would result in unnecessary competition among different 
religious groups, the government convened a multilateral meeting 
among all the major religious groups. The result was an agreement 
that all groups would refrain from using loudspeakers except within 
their premises. This of course required Muslims to abandon their 
155. Id.
156. B.C., The Effect of Laws, or Their Absence, THE ECONOMIST: ERASMUS
(May 22, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2013/05/religion-freedom-
and-social-peace [https://perma.cc/5VHB-6MBP].
157. This issue was addressed in the Israel context and the solution was to 
impose facially neutral laws, which nonetheless has disparate impact on religious 
groups. 
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then current practice to use loudspeakers, while requiring the other 
religious groups to refrain from making such requests in the future.158
A compromise was forged without the use of laws or litigation, and 
peaceful coexistence ensured. 
The same article in The Economist rightly observed that “social 
peace depends on more than the presence or absence of laws.”159
Indeed, other preconditions should be in place for social harmony to 
exist such as a commitment among the different groups to coexist 
peaceably.160 However, the presence of laws can encourage such a 
commitment. Indeed, the minimally secular but non-liberal state may 
in some circumstances, such as where there is a strong commitment 
to peaceful coexistence among different groups, be in a better 
position than is often assumed to ensure religious tolerance. This 
Article rejects the assumption that is often made that the liberal 
understanding of secularism is normatively desirable under all 
circumstances. The non-liberal secular approach is not perfect, but it 
is defensible and could even be said to be appropriate under certain 
conditions. Secularism, as a political philosophy, can play different 
functions in different contexts. Consequently, in response to the 
theme of this special issue—whether secularism is a non-negotiable 
part of liberal constitutionalism—the answer to this is: Maybe, but 
that’s the wrong question to ask.
158. I accept Seval Yilidrim’s point made during the AALS panel that the 
government’s actions in convening the meeting are an exercise of dominance. 
However, I do not think that all forms of dominance are necessarily undesirable. 
159. B.C., supra note 156.
160. See id.
